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1. Introduction
Consider a market in which a consumer needs a treatment for a problem
(e.g., a medical condition) from an expert (e.g., a physician). There can be
two possible treatments, and the expert has private information about which
is appropriate for the consumer. Given his information advantage, the expert
may recommend to and provide the consumer with the “wrong” treatment,
providing major treatment when only minor treatment is needed (overtreat-
ment) or providing minor treatment when major treatment is necessary (un-
dertreatment), if doing so increases his payoff. An extensive literature on
credence goods has analyzed this adverse selection problem.1 A prominent
result from this literature is that equal price margin for the two treatments
restores efficiency under adverse selection: the expert will recommend the
appropriate treatment if he is made indifferent in his payoff between the two
treatments.
In many cases, the expert may need to exert (additional) effort to deter-
mine the consumer’s problem and the type of treatment that is appropriate.
For example, when a patient complains about arrhythmia, it may indicate
a minor problem that requires a minor treatment (e.g., follow-up checkups,
possibly with some medication), but it may also signal a serious heart prob-
lem that requires surgery (a major treatment). The physician may need to
exert (extra) effort —such as spending more time with the patient, investi-
gating related symptoms, searching relevant information—to determine the
1See, e.g., Darby and Karni (1973), Taylor (1995), Emons (1997, 2001), Fong (2005),
and Alger and Salanie (2006). Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) review this literature
in a unified setup. Recent papers on credence goods include Liu (2011) that analyses a
market with conscientious and selfish experts, Fong, Liu and Wright (2014) that study the
impact of verifiability and liability on the expert’s behavior, Dulleck and Wigger (2015)
that model the services of politicians as credence goods, and Hilger (2016) that analyses
the expert’s behavior when the expert’s treatment cost is private information.
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type of treatment that is necessary. When the diagnosis effort and its cost
are the expert’s private information, he may not exert it even if doing so is
efficient. This moral hazard problem, which has been largely ignored in the
extant literature on credence goods,2 can lead to additional market ineffi-
ciencies. In particular, while the equal price margin condition can remove
the distortion due to adverse selection, it may also eliminate the incentive
for the expert to exert effort to learn which treatment is appropriate for the
consumer.
In this paper, we investigate the potential role of liability in disciplining
the expert’s behavior in a model that captures the market environments as
described above. The consumer requires either a major or minor treatment
depending on the type of her problem, and there is some common prior belief
about the consumer type. Upon seeing the consumer, with a positive prob-
ability, the expert either immediately learns which treatment is appropriate
(due to his expertise), or can exert (additional) costly private effort to ob-
tain this information. After the treatment, for which the expert receives a
fee from the consumer, if the consumer suffers from a wrong treatment, there
is some probability that the consumer can find and verify the loss, in which
case the expert is required to compensate the consumer according to some
liability rule.
The existing literature on credence goods assumes that consumers are
unable to learn whether the expert has recommended the appropriate treat-
ment, at least in the case of overtreatment which, by assumption, solves
the consumer’s problem (e.g., Emons,1997, 2001; Fong, 2005; Dulleck and
2A recent paper by Bester and Dahm (2017) is a notable exception. They study a model
of credence goods incorporating both adverse selection and moral hazard, focusing on the
design of optimal contract when payment can be made contingent upon the consumer’s
report of her subjective evaluation of the treatment outcome.
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Kerschbamer, 2006). Thus, the analysis in the literature presumes either
infinite liability if undertreatment can be identified or no liability even if a
consumer suffers from wrong treatment. We shall also call the expert services
in our model “credence goods’, but depart from the literature by assuming
that the consumer may verify her loss with some positive probability when
a wrong treatment is provided by the expert. What we have in mind are sit-
uations where both undertreatment and overtreatment can cause consumer
loss. Even if the consumer cannot directly learn whether the appropriate
treatment has been provided, she may find this information ex post—if she
has suffered some loss—from other experts. The US federal government’s
recent effort in applying False Claims Act against overtreatment in medi-
care, for instance, suggests that a malpractice in medicare, which is typically
considered as a type of credence good, can be discovered with a positive
probability so that penalties may be imposed on providers who engage in
overtreatment.3
We assume that liability for the expert can be a function of the losses from
mistreatments and other commonly known parameters. The prices for the
two treatments are assumed to be set to maximize consumer surplus, subject
to a non-negative profit constraint for the expert. We find that for a wide
range of liability rules, the equilibrium prices are such that the expert will
receive the same expected profit—taking into account the expected liability
3Buck (2013) reported that “Exemplified by the Department of Justice’s ongoing
implantable cardioverter defibrillator investigation, the federal government is seeking
to regulate overtreatment through application of its powerful anti-fraud statute.” The
federal government is reported to rely heavily on “data mining” to identify doctors
who administer procedures differently from the majority. On the other hand, medical
providers in the US are reported to form expert committees to identify commonly used
procedures that are often clinically unnecessary and are highly expensive. See Brian
Vastag, Doctors Groups Call for End to Unnecessary Procedures, Wash. Post (Apr.
4, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-checkup/post/doctors-
groups-call-for- end-to-unnecessary-procedures/2012/04/03/gIQAvrDptS blog.html.
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cost—from the two treatments under the prior belief. The price margins for
the two treatments generally differ, but they are close enough to compel the
expert to prescribe the appropriate treatment based on his best information.
Remarkably, here the “equal price margin” condition is no longer required
to solve the adverse selection problem, because the presence of liability re-
laxes the incentive constraint for the expert to reveal his private information
truthfully. In fact, the familiar result that price margins are equalized for the
two treatments emerges in equilibrium as a special case of our model under
zero liability.
While there are many liability rules under which the expert will provide
honest recommendation about the appropriate treatment, they generally do
not provide the efficient incentive for the expert to exert diagnosis effort when
needed. We show that there exists an optimal liability rule, together with
the equilibrium prices it induces, that leads to the efficient effort choice and
information disclosure by the expert. The optimal liability rule specifies a
damage payment for a verified loss—contingent on whether the loss is due to
overtreatment or undertreatment—that equates the price margin from each
treatment to the efficient critical threshold of the expert’s diagnosis cost.
Then, in the event that the expert does not learn the nature of the problem
upon seeing the consumer, he will choose to incur the additional cost to
obtain this information if and only if it is efficient to do so; and the expert
will recommend the appropriate treatment to the best of his knowledge,
whether through the information upon seeing the consumer, from incurring
the diagnosis cost, or using his prior belief if no updated information is
obtained.
We further show that a well-designed liability rule also leads to the effi-
cient outcome in the case that the expert can only obtain a noisy signal about
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the nature of the consumer’s problem, provided the signal is sufficiently in-
formative. However, if the signal is not sufficiently informative, the prices
and liability that ensure truthful reporting of information by the expert can
no longer induce the expert to exert the efficient effort.
Our paper contributes to the credence goods literature by analyzing a
combined problem of adverse selection and moral hazard and exploring how
liability can be used to possibly achieve both efficient diagnosis effort and
honest recommendation of appropriate treatment. Dulleck and Kerschbamer
(2009) investigate the incentives of experts to exert diagnostic effort and to
report truthfully when the experts face competition from discounters and
the consumers may free-ride on the expert’s diagnosis effort and switch to
cheaper services by discounters who can not perform diagnosis. They assume
perfect verifiability in case of undertreatment and no verifiability in case of
overtreatment. Bester and Dahm (2017) examine a combined problem that is
similar to ours. They assume that the outcome of treatment is not verifiable
and explore whether a payment scheme contingent upon the consumer’s re-
port of the treatment outcome can be used to implement efficiency.4 Different
from these papers, we assume that the outcome of either type of treatment
is verifiable with some probability and analyze whether a liability rule can
be designed to restore market efficiency.
We also contribute to the economic analysis of liability rules in different
environments.5 Daughety and Reinganum (1995, 2008), Spier (2011), Hua
4The papers by Demski and Sappington (1987) and Taylor (1995) consider costly diag-
nosis effort but assume treatment decisions are unobservable. Pesendorfer and Wolinsky
(2003) analyse a model in which the experts need to exert diagnosis effort to discover the
buyer’s demand and show that the gathering of multiple opinions leads to underinvestment
by the suppliers. There, it is assumed that the experts will report their private information
truthfully.
5Brown (1973) and Shavell (1980) laid the foundation for the economic analysis of
liabilities. See Shavel (2007) for a survey on more recent analysis of liabilities for accidents.
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(2011), Chen and Hua (2012) analyze how liability rules affect a producer’s
incentive to improve product safety ex ante and the incentive to warn con-
sumers or recalling a defective product ex post. The distinctive features of
credence goods raise new issues and the optimal liability possesses very dif-
ferent properties. Simon (1982), Arlen and MacLeod (2005), Wright (2011)
compare strict liability with negligence rule for medical malpractice. These
models focus on the diagnosis effort aspect and ignore the adverse selection
feature of credence goods, with the main result being that negligence rule is
generally more effective than strict liability. But negligence rule is difficult
to enforce in practice because it requires the determination of whether the
expert has exercised due care, which is likely the expert’s hidden action. In
comparison, liability rules that are based on verified loss are easier to im-
plement. Our analysis shows that a well designed liability rule can achieve
the efficient outcome, in a setting where the expert needs to be provided
with proper incentives both in exerting diagnosis effort and in recommend-
ing treatment.
In the rest of the paper, we describe our model in section 2. Section 3
conducts the analysis and presents our main results. In section 4, we extend
our model to examine the case where diagnosis effort only leads to a noisy
signal about the type of the consumer’s problem. Section 5 offers concluding
remarks, together with a discussion of the policy implications of our results.
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2. The Model
A consumer needs a treatment from an expert for a problem that can be
either minor or major, t ∈ {m,M} , where
Pr (t = m) = θ = 1− Pr (t =M) ∈ (0, 1) . (1)
The expert can provide two types of treatments, a minor treatment Tm or
a major treatment TM . A minor treatment (Tm) is appropriate if the con-
sumer’s problem is minor (m) while a major treatment (TM) is appropriate
if the problem is major (M). If the problem is not treated, the consumer
suffers a loss xt if the problem is type t ∈ {M,m}, with her expected loss
without treatment as
x ≡ θxm + (1− θ)xM . (2)
If the consumer receives a treatment from the expert, the consumer’s gross
utility, which depends on her type (t) and the treatment she receives, is
v (t, T ) =


0 if t = m and T = Tm or t =M and T = TM
−zu if t =M and T = Tm
−zo if t = m and T = TM
. (3)
Thus, the consumer’s gross utility is normalized to zero if she receives the
appropriate treatment for her problem. If the type is M but the treatment
is Tm, undertreatment occurs and the consumer suffers a loss zu > 0. On the
other hand, overtreatment occurs when the type is m but the treatment is
TM , in which case the harm to the consumer is zo > 0. We further assume
that with probability αu ∈ (0, 1], the consumer is able to verify her loss zu
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when undertreatment has occurred, and with probability αo ∈ (0, 1] she is
able to verify her loss zo when overtreatment has occurred.
Note that the way we define consumer’s utility is different from that in
the literature. In the literature the harm from overtreatment is usually nor-
malized to zero, and the consumer receives the same utility if her problem is
resolved, whether it is resolved through proper treatment or overtreatment.
Furthermore, undertreatment leads to the same utility as no treatment. (See,
e.g. Emons, 1997, Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006). We depart from this
modeling by assuming that overtreatment also leads to a harm for the con-
sumer (we could allow zo = 0 as a special case) and undertreatment may
lead to a loss different from no treatment (with the two being equal as a
special case). By adopting this more general setup, we wish to incorporate
the increasing concern over the harm from overtreatment in practice. (See,
for example, Brownlee, 2008; Buck, 2013, 2015.) It also allows us to analyze
the role of liability in a more general and realistic setting.6
The expert is better informed about the nature of the consumer’s problem,
and, if necessary, can exert extra efforts to diagnose the problem. Specifically,
we assume that upon seeing the consumer, with probability β ∈ [0, 1) the
expert is informed about the realization of t (i.e., whether t = m or M),
while with probability 1− β he is not informed of t but privately learns the
realization of k, his private cost for exerting some additional diagnosis effort
to learn the realization of t.7 Ex ante, k follows a continuous probability
distribution F (k) on support
[
0, k¯
]
, with k¯ > 0 . We denote the expert’s
decision on whether to incur k—if he does not observe the realization of t
upon seeing the consumer—by e ∈ {E,N} . If he chooses E by incurring k,
6Our analysis and results would remain the same if we interpret zu and zo as the
expected losses associated with undertreatment and overtreatment.
7This effort is beyond the observable normal effort associated with seeing the consumer.
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the expert learns the realization of t, while if he chooses N (i.e., incurring no
k) the expert maintains his prior belief about t. Whether the expert incurs
the diagnosis cost is his private information.
Treatments Tm and TM cost the expert 0 and C > 0, respectively, with
(i) C + θzo < x, and (ii) C < zu(1− θ) (4)
so that (i) it is not efficient to have no treatment, and (ii) without knowing
whether t = m or M , there exist parameter values under which TM is more
efficient than Tm. We assume that the type of treatment provided to the
consumer is publicly observed (e.g., whether a certain procedure is carried
out). Thus, if the expert recommends treatment TM , cost C must be incurred
to implement the treatment. The consumer is committed to undertaking the
treatment recommended by the expert. That is, we assume “verifiability”
and “commitment” in our model.8
The expert may be liable for a bad outcome that is a result of maltreat-
ment. Specifically, we assume that the expert is required to pay damage
Du > 0 if it is verified that the consumer has received undertreatment with
loss zu, and he is required to pay damage Do > 0 if it is verified that the
consumer has received overtreatment with loss zo.
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Let PM and Pm be the prices for treatments TM and Tm. The timing of
the game, given a liability rule (Du, Do) , proceeds as follows:
8See Dulleck and Kerschbamer(2006) for discussions on the assumption of verifiability
and commitment.
9In the existing literature on credence goods, the assumption of “liability” typically
refers to unlimited liability for undertreatment (Du = +∞). This, together with the
assumption zo = 0, deters undertreatment. Our more general formulation allows us to
analyse the impact of different liabilities on the expert’s behavior and the optimal liability
rule.
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1. The consumer sets prices (PM , Pm) for the two types of treatments
respectively.
2. Upon seeing the consumer, the expert either learns the realization of
t and chooses T ∈ {Tm, TM} , or, without learning t, he learns the
realizations of his (additional) private diagnosis cost k. The expert
chooses whether to exert diagnosis effort and the type of treatment to
propose to the consumer.
3. The treatment recommended by the expert is implemented and pay-
ment (PM or Pm) is made.
4. If a loss from treatment is verified, the expert compensates the con-
sumer an amount according to the liability rule.
Notice that there are potentially four dimensions of asymmetric infor-
mation in our model: the expert’s private information about (i) whether he
learns the realization of t upon seeing the consumer, (ii) the realization of
k, (iii) whether he incurs the diagnosis cost, and (iv) whether t = m or M ,
with or without incurring k.
3. Analysis
In this section, we first describe the efficient benchmark, then characterize
the equilibrium of the game between the expert and the consumer, and finally
identify the optimal liability rule that implements the efficient outcome.
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3.1 Efficient Benchmark
Suppose there is a social planner who learns all the private information of
the expert and can dictate the expert on what to be done in each case. If
the expert learns t upon seeing the consumer, it is clearly efficient for him
to choose Ti when t = i for i = m,M. So we focus on the case where the
expert needs to incur k if it is necessary to learn t. The total surpluses of the
expert and the consumer from strategies (N, TM) (implementing TM without
incurring diagnosis cost k) and (N, Tm) (implementing Tm without incurring
cost k) are respectively
W (N, TM) = −θzo − C; W (N, Tm) = −(1− θ)zu. (5)
Following an action E, the efficient choice for the expert is Tm if t = m and
TM if t =M,. This strategy ET leads to
W (ET ) = −k − (1− θ)C.
By the assumption on C from part (i) of (4),
W (N, TM) = −θzo − C > −x,
so that if the expert has no additional information about t beyond his
prior belief, a major treatment is better than no treatment. Moreover,
W (N, TM) ≥W (N, Tm) if and only if
zo ≤ zu(1− θ)− C
θ
≡ z∗
o
or zu ≥ θzo + C
1− θ ≡ z
∗
u
. (critical z)
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That is, if the expert must choose the treatment based on his prior be-
lief about t, it is efficient to choose TM if the harm from overtreatment is
relatively small compared to undertreatment (zo ≤ z∗o), and to choose Tm
otherwise. Notice that z∗
o
, which is positive by the assumption on C from
part (ii) of (4), is increasing in zu and decreasing in C.
Incurring the diagnosis cost is efficient whenW (ET ) ≥ max {W (N, TM), W (N, Tm)},
which holds if and only if
k ≤ min{θ (C + zo) , (1− θ) (zu − C) , k¯} ≡ k∗ (zo, zu) , (6)
where we allow the possibility that k¯ may be below min {θ (C + zo) , (1− θ) (zu − C)} .
Lemma 1 summarizes the efficient benchmark.
Lemma 1 If the expert learns t upon seeing the consumer, it is efficient for
him to choose Ti when t = i for i = m,M. Otherwise: (i) If k > k
∗ (zo, zu)
and zo ≤ z∗o , it is efficient to choose (N, TM). (ii) If k > k∗ (zo, zu) and
zo > z
∗
o
, it is efficient to choose (N, Tm). (iii) If k ≤ k∗ (zo, zu) , it is efficient
to choose ET .
Thus, when the expert is not informed about t upon seeing the consumer,
the efficient decision by the expert depends straightforwardly on the realized
value of k and on the value of zo relative to z
∗
o
: When the diagnosis cost is
sufficiently high, it is efficient to have TM without incurring k if the loss from
overtreatment is small enough, while it is efficient to have Tm without incur-
ring k if the loss from overtreatment is high enough; when the diagnosis cost
is sufficiently low, it is efficient to incur k and then chooses the appropriate
treatment. Notice that when k∗ (zo, zu) = k¯, it is always efficient to incur the
diagnosis cost.
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3.2 Equilibrium of the Expert-Consumer Game
We now analyze the game between the expert and the consumer, taking the
liability rule (D) as given. Without loss of generality, denote any pair of
prices by
PM = C + ΦM , Pm = Φm, (7)
where ΦM ≥ 0 and Φm ≥ 0 are the price margins or markups for the expert
if he provides treatments TM and Tm, respectively, without accounting for
potential diagnosis or liability costs. Each pair of prices—or equivalently
(ΦM ,Φm)—posted by the consumer is followed by a treatment game between
the expert and the consumer.
If the expert knows the realization of t, either upon seeing the consumer
or after incurring k, it would be optimal for him to choose Ti when t = i for
i = m,M if and only if
ΦM ≥ Φm − αuDu, Φm ≥ ΦM − αoDo. (8)
Our analysis will proceed under the presumption that (8) holds—so that the
expert will choose the appropriate treatment if he knows what t is—and we
later confirm that this is indeed the case in equilibrium and a pair of prices
that satisfy (8) is indeed optimal for the consumer.
Notice that for (8) to hold, ΦM = Φm if Du = Do = 0. That is, in order
for the expert recommend the appropriate treatment given his information,
equal price margins from different treatments are required when no liability
can be imposed on the expert.10 When there are positive liabilities, though
ΦM = Φm is sufficient for (8), it is no longer necessary: as long as the price
10See, e.g., Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006.
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margins for the two treatments are not too different, the expert will have the
right incentive to recommend the appropriate treatment if he knows t. The
presence of malpractice liability relaxes constraint (8).
Given (8), under which the expert will choose Ti for t = i if he learns
the realization of t upon seeing the consumer, we can focus our analysis on
three strategies that the expert can choose from if he does not initially learn
t: (i) (N, TM): choosing TM without incurring k. (ii) (N, Tm): choosing Tm
without incurring k; and (iii) ET : incurring k, followed by the choices of Ti
when t = i for i = m,M. For a given D ≡ (Du, Do) and k, the expert’s
profits under each of these strategies are, respectively:
pi(N, TM) = ΦM − θαoDo, pi(N, Tm) = Φm − (1− θ)αuDu, (9a)
pi(ET ) = θΦm + (1− θ)ΦM − k, (9b)
where θαoDo is the expert’s expected liability payment to the consumer under
(N, TM), since overtreatment occurs with probability θ; and, similarly, (1 −
θ)αuDu is the expert’s expected liability payment to the consumer under
(N, TM). The expert will make his choice to maximize his expected payoff;
when he has the same expected payoff from any two options, we assume that
he will choose the option that is favorable to the consumer.
We further assume that the consumer is constrained to set a pair of prices
satisfying
pi(N, TM) ≥ 0, pi(N, Tm) ≥ 0, (10)
so that the expert, whose outside option is zero profit, can receive non-
negative expected profit from providing each treatment under the common
prior about t. What we have in mind are situations where both the expert
and the consumer have some pricing/bargaining power: the expert can insist
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on charging prices that would ensure non-negative profit for offering each
treatment under the prior belief about t, whereas the consumer can offer
prices subject to this constraint.11
Upon seeing the consumer, the expert either learns the realization of t
and chooses T ∈ {Tm, TM} , or, without learning t, he learns the realiza-
tions of his (additional) private diagnosis cost k and chooses his action from
{(N, TM), (N, Tm), ET}.
In the treatment game following a pair of prices Φ ≡ (ΦM ,Φm), the
expert’s optimal strategy when he does not learn t upon seeing the consumer
is ET if and only if pi(ET ) ≥ max{pi(N, TM), pi(N, Tm)}, or k is sufficiently
small:
k ≤ min{θ (Φm − ΦM + αoDo) , (1− θ) (ΦM − Φm + αuDu)} ≡ kˆ(D,Φ).
(11)
When k > kˆ(D,Φ), the expert prefers strategy (N, TM) to strategy (N, Tm)
if and only if
pi(N, TM)− pi(N, Tm) = ΦM − θαoDo − [Φm − (1− θ)αuDu] > 0. (12)
On the other hand, the consumer surplus from the three strategies are
respectively
S(N, TM) = θ [−zo − ΦM − C + αoDo] + (1− θ) [0− ΦM − C] , (13)
S(N, Tm) = θ [−Φm] + (1− θ) [−zu + αuDu − Φm] , (14)
S (ET ) = −θΦm − (1− θ) (ΦM + C) . (15)
11Alternatively, we may assume that the consumer has a sufficiently high value to receive
the “right” treatment in each state. Then, she indeed has the incentive to set prices
satisfying (10), so that the expert is willing to provide the treatment.
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Thus, consumer surplus is higher if Φm and ΦM are lower in each case. We
also note that
S (ET )− S(N, TM) = θ [ΦM − Φm + C + zo − αoDo] , (16)
S (ET )− S(N, Tm) = (1− θ) (Φm − ΦM − C + zu − αuDu) . (17)
The result below refers to condition
αuDu + αoDo ≤ min
{
C + zo
1− θ ,
zu − C
θ
}
. (18)
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, for any given D = (Du, Do) satisfying (18),
Φ = Φˆ =
(
ΦˆM , Φˆm
)
, where:
ΦˆM = θαoDo, and Φˆm = (1− θ)αuDu. (19)
(i) If the expert learns t upon seeing the consumer, he will choose Tt for
t = m,M. (ii) Otherwise, he will incur k if and only if k ≤ kˆ
(
D, Φˆ
)
=
θ(1 − θ) (αuDu + αoDo) , and after incurring k the expert will choose Tt for
t = m,M ; while without incurring k he will choose TM if zo < z
∗
o
and Tm if
zo > z
∗
o
.
Proof. Note that the price Φˆ indeed satisfy (8) and is the lowest pos-
sible price satisfying (10). Suppose to the contrary that in equilibrium
Φ = (ΦM ,Φm) 6= (ΦˆM , Φˆm). Then, from (10), (ΦM ,Φm) must be such that
pi(N, Ti) > 0 for at least one i. We show that the consumer can then in-
crease her expected surplus by choosing some different price, contradicting
the optimality of (ΦM ,Φm) for the consumer.
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Under (ΦM ,Φm), let pi(N, TM)− pi(N, Tm) = ∆. Then from (9),
ΦM − Φm = ∆+ θαoDo − (1− θ)αuDu. (20)
From (11), if the expert does not learn t upon seeing the consumer, he will
choose to incur k if and only if k does not exceed
kˆ(D,Φ) = min {θ (Φm − ΦM + αoDo) , (1− θ) (ΦM − Φm + αuDu)}
= min{θ [−∆− θαoDo + (1− θ)αuDu + αoDo] ,
(1− θ) [∆ + θαoDo − (1− θ)αuDu + αuDu]}
= min {θ [−∆+ (1− θ) (αoDo + αuDu)] , (1− θ) [∆ + θ (αoDo + αuDu)]}
=


θ [−∆+ (1− θ) (αoDo + αuDu)] if ∆ > 0
(1− θ) [∆ + θ (αoDo + αuDu)] if ∆ < 0
.
We consider in turn two cases.
Case 1: ∆ 6= 0. If ∆ > 0, then pi(N, TM) > pi(N, Tm) ≥ 0 and the expert
would choose TM if he is not initially informed about t and also does not
incur k. From (16) and (20):
S (ET )− S(N, TM) = θ [ΦM − Φm + C + zo − αoDo]
= θ [∆ + θαoDo − (1− θ)αuDu + C + zo − αoDo]
= θ [∆ + C + zo − (1− θ) (αuDu + αoDo)] > 0.
The consumer prefers ET to (N, TM). Therefore, by reducing ΦM slightly,
∆ becomes smaller and kˆ(D,Φ) will rise—so that the expert incurs k more
often while (8) continues to hold—and the consumer will also pay a lower
expected price. Therefore this change increases the consumer’s expected
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surplus. Thus, a pair of prices with ∆ > 0 is not optimal for the consumer.
If ∆ < 0, the expert would choose Tm if he is not initially informed about
t and also does not incur k, and a similar argument shows
S (ET )− S(N, Tm) = (1− θ) (Φm − ΦM − C + zu − αuDu)
= (1− θ) [−∆+ zu − C − θ (αuDu + αoDo)] > 0,
and the consumer can increase her surplus by reducing Φm.
Moreover, if the expert learns t upon seeing the consumer, the reduction
in ΦM or Φm always increases consumer surplus given that (8) is satisfied.
Case 2: ∆ = 0. Then if pi(N, TM) = pi(N, Tm) > 0, by lowering both ΦM
and Φm to the levels where pi(N, TM) = pi(N, Tm) = 0, kˆ(D,Φ) is unchanged
but the consumer will pay a lower expected price, which increases her surplus.
Combining with (10), we have shown (19) is the optimal choice of price
for the consumer.
Next, from (11), the expert incurs k if and only if k ≤ kˆ
(
D, Φˆ
)
=
θ(1 − θ) [αuDu + αoDo] . Since the (ΦˆM , Φˆm) from (19) satisfy (8), whether
the expert learns t upon seeing the consumer or after incurring k, the expert
will indeed choose Tt for t = m,M.
Finally, under (19), the expert receives the same expected profit from
choosing (N, TM) and (N, Tm) . Hence it is an equilibrium for him to choose
TM if zo < z
∗
o
and Tm if zo > z
∗
o
. Moreover, under (ΦˆM , Φˆm), from (13) and
(14):
S (N, TM) = −ΦˆM − C + θαoDo − θzo = −θαoDo − C + θαoDo − θzo = −C − θzo,
S (N, Tm) = −Φˆm + (1− θ)αuDu − (1− θ) zu = − (1− θ) zu.
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Thus the consumer will prefer (N, TM) to (N, Tm) if zo < z
∗
o
and prefer
(N, Tm) to (N, TM) if zo > z
∗
o
. Therefore, since by assumption the expert will
choose the action desired by the consumer when facing two actions that have
the same expected payoff to him, the only equilibrium when k > kˆ (D,Φ) is
for the expert to choose TM if zo < z
∗
o
and Tm if zo < z
∗
o
.
A few comments about the equilibrium are in order. First, in equilibrium
the expert has the same (zero) expected profit in treatments TM and Tm if
he holds the prior belief about t. Notice that this result is obtained under
the assumption that the consumer makes prices offers under the constraint
that expert is able to earn a non-negative profit in each treatment without
incurring k. Without the constraint that pi (N, Tt) ≥ 0 for t = m,M, the
consumer may offer prices so that pi (N, Tt) < 0 for at least one t. In that case,
kˆ(D,Φ) will also become smaller such that the expert exerts less diagnosis
effort. But the benefit from doing so is to receive a larger surplus (paying a
lower price) in the case that the expert learns t upon seeing the consumer. If
β is relatively small and the expert’s diagnosis effort is important, choosing
prices satisfying (10) will be optimal for the consumer.
Second, unlike the result in the literature, in our model the two treat-
ments need not have equal price margins to induce the expert to choose the
appropriate treatment when he knows the realization of t. Rather, the two
treatments need to have the same expected profit—given the expected liabil-
ity cost—under the expert’s prior belief about t. Moreover, if the liability Du
or Do is high enough so that (18) is violated, it might be to the advantage of
the consumer that the expert does not learn the realization of t and provides
the wrong treatment, in which case the consumer could collect the (exces-
sively) high damage payment. Thus, if the liability is not properly designed,
the equilibrium incentive could be perverse. This adverse situation will not
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arise if the liability satisfies (18), which induces price margins for the two
treatments that are close enough to satisfy (8).
Third, for any given liabilities (Do and Du) satisfying (18), while the
equilibrium prices will induce the expert to choose the efficient treatment
given his information, whether under the prior belief about t or knowing
the realization of t (possibly by incurring k), under these prices kˆ(D, Φˆ) will
generally not equal to k∗(zo, zu). Therefore the equilibrium generally does
not lead to the efficient diagnosis decision. Notice also that the expert whose
realized k is below kˆ(D, Φˆ) will receive positive profit—the information rent—
in equilibrium.
3.3 Efficient Liability
In this subsection, we show that there exists a liability rule that would lead
to the efficient outcome as described in Lemma 1.
Recall that under the equilibrium prices given in (19), inefficiency arises
only when kˆ (D,Φ) 6= k∗ (zo, zu) , where
k∗ (zo, zu) = min
{
θ (C + zo) , (1− θ)(zu − C), k¯
}
,
with k∗ (zo, zu) = min
{
θ (C + zo) , k¯
}
if z ≤ z∗
o
and k∗ (zo, zu) = min
{
(1− θ)(zu − C), k¯
}
if z > z∗
o
. We can find an efficient liability rule that ensures kˆ (D,Φ) =
k∗ (zo, zu) . Let D
∗ = (D∗
u
, D∗
o
) be the efficient liability, and (ΦˆM , Φˆm) =
(Φ∗
M
,Φ∗
m
) be the the equilibrium price margins under D∗.
Proposition 2 The following liability rule results in the efficient outcome
in equilibrium:
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D∗
u
=
k∗ (zo, zu)
(1− θ)αu , D
∗
o
=
k∗ (zo, zu)
θαo
. (21)
Proof. The liability under (21) satisfies (18), and hence in equilibrium the
price margins satisfy (19), with Φ∗
M
= Φ∗
m
= min
{
θ (C + zo) , k¯
}
if zo ≤ z∗o
and Φ∗
M
= Φ∗
m
= min
{
(1− θ)(zu − C), k¯
}
if zo > z
∗
o
. Note that under
(D∗
u
, D∗
o
) ,
kˆ(D∗,Φ∗) = θ(1− θ) (αuDu + αoDo)
= θ(1− θ)
(
αu
k∗ (zo, zu)
(1− θ)αu + αo
k∗ (zo, zu)
θαo
)
= k∗ (zo, zu)
Thus, efficiency is achieved in equilibrium.
Notice that with the liability that implements the efficient outcome, the
equilibrium price margin for each treatment is equal to the efficient critical
k value, k∗(zo, zu). Thus, while there exist a range of liabilities that would
induce the equilibrium markups given in (19) for the two treatments and
these markups generally differ, under the optimal liability they are the same.
Also notice that the efficient liability depends on F (·) only through k¯,
and is otherwise invariant with respect to the form of F (·) . When k¯ <
min {θ (C + zo) , (1− θ)(zu − C)} , it is always efficient for the expert to in-
cur the diagnosis cost. The efficient liability in this case is
D∗
u
=
k¯
(1− θ)αu , and D
∗
o
=
k¯
θαo
,
both of which increase in k¯, with D∗
u
→ 0 and D∗
o
→ 0 when k¯ → 0. In-
tuitively, imposing a liability has a cost to the consumer, because the price
for the expert’s service will have to increase to cover the expected liability
cost. Hence, when the expert can learn the nature of the problem with little
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additional diagnosis cost, the efficient liability also goes to zero.
When k∗(zo, zu) < k¯, it is no longer always efficient to incur k. Then, if zo
is below a certain critical value (z∗
o
), the efficient threshold k∗ is θ (C + zo) ,
and the optimal liabilities for overtreatment and for undertreatment both
increases in zo, C and θ, which maintains the efficient incentive for the expert
to exert the diagnosis effort. On the other hand, if zo > z
∗
o
, the efficient
threshold k∗(zo, zu) is (1− θ)(zu−C), and to maintain the expert’s incentive
to exert the diagnosis effort, Do and Du both increase in zu but decrease in
C, while Do also decreases in θ.
Notice that the efficient Do and Du vary in the same direction as the
relevant parameter values change, so that the relative profit margins from
the two treatments are maintained.
The efficient liability can be expressed as a multiplier of the loss from
undertreatment or overtreatment: Du = γuzu and Do = γozo, where
γu =
k∗ (zo, zu)
(1− θ)αuzu , γo =
k∗ (zo, zu)
θαozo
. (22)
Notice that when k¯ → 0, both γ
u
→ 0 and γ
o
→ 0, while it’s also possible
that γ
u
> 1 or γ
o
> 1 (i.e., there can be punitive damages). Moreover,
under the optimal liability, as the loss from overtreatment becomes more
likely to be verified relative to the loss from undertreatment, the penalty for
undertreatment will increase (in the sense that γu becomes higher relative
to γ
o
). However, since in general γ
u
6= γ
o
, if the liability multipliers are
constrained to be the same—say, γ—for both types of losses, there is no
guarantee that the market outcome will be efficient even when γ is chosen
optimally.
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4. Noisy Diagnosis
Our main model has assumed that, when necessary, the expert can discover
the nature of the consumer’s problem by incurring the diagnosis cost. In
this section we extend the model to consider the possibility of imperfect
diagnosis. Specifically, in the event that the expert does not learn t upon
seeing the consumer, he can privately observe a noisy signal s ∈ {sm, sM}
about t by incurring the private diagnosis cost k. The signal is correct with
probability σ about the true type of the consumer, that is
Pr(sm | t = m) = σ = Pr{sM | t =M}, (23a)
Pr(sm | t =M) = 1− σ = Pr{sM | t = m}. (23b)
We assume
σ >
max {(1− θ)(zu − C), θ(C + zo)}
(1− θ)(zu − C) + θ(C + zo) ≡ σ (24)
so that the signal is informative and there exist parameter values under which
it is efficient for the expert to exert diagnosis effort.12 We further assume
θ > 1
2
so that the consumer’s problem is more likely to be minor. Everything
else remains the same as in the main model.
Note that the total surpluses from strategies (N, TM) and (N, Tm) are not
affected by the noisy signal. The total surplus from strategy ET—exerting
diagnosis effort and recommending Tt if signal st is received—is
W (ET ) = θ [(1− σ) (−C − zo)] + (1− θ) [−σC − (1− σ) zu]− k (25)
= θσ(zo + C)− (1− θ)(1− σ)(zu − C)− C − θzo − k. (26)
12If σ ≤ σ, it would not be efficient for the expert to exert diagnosis effort. In that case
an equal price margin on the two treatments would lead to the efficient outcome.
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Exerting effort is efficient when W (ET ) ≥ max {W (N, TM),W (N, Tm)} ,
which holds if
k ≤ min

 θσ (C + zo)− (1− θ) (1− σ) (zu − C) ,
(1− θ) σ (zu − C)− θ (1− σ) (C + zo) , k¯

 ≡ k∗∗ (zo, zu) . (27)
For σ < 1, k∗∗ (zo, zu) < k
∗(zo, zu). Imperfect diagnosis reduces the critical
value of diagnosis cost. Assumption (24) ensures k∗∗(zo, zu) > 0 so that if
k < k∗∗(zo, zu) it is efficient for the expert to acquire the signal.
Lemma 2 summarizes the first-best outcome when diagnosis is imperfect.
Lemma 2 With noisy diagnosis, if the expert learns t upon seeing the con-
sumer, it is efficient for him to choose Tt for t = m,M . Otherwise: (i) If k >
k∗∗ (zo, zu) and zo ≤ z∗o , it is efficient to choose (N, TM); (ii) If k > k∗∗ (zo, zu)
and zo ≥ z∗o , it is efficient to choose (N, Tm); (iii) If k ≤ k∗∗ (zo, zu), it is
efficient to choose ET and follow the signal (i.e., recommending Tt if signal
st is received).
Given a pair of prices Φ = (ΦM ,Φm), the expert’s profit from strategies
(N, TM) and (N, Tm) are the same as in the main model, but the profit from
ET becomes:
pi(ET ) = θ [σΦm + (1− σ)(ΦM − αoDo)]+(1−θ) [σΦM + (1− σ)(Φm − αuDu)]−k.
The expert’s optimal strategy isET if and only if pi(ET ) ≥ max{pi(N, TM), pi(N, Tm)},
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or equivalently if and only if k is sufficiently small:
k ≤ min


[θσ + (1− θ)(1− σ)] (Φm − ΦM) + θσαoDo − (1− θ)(1− σ)αuDu,
[θ(1− σ) + (1− θ)σ] (ΦM − Φm)− θ(1− σ)αoDo + (1− θ)σαuDu


≡ k˜(D,Φ). (28)
If the expert needs to incur k, it would be optimal for him to follow signal
st if and only if the prices (ΦM ,Φm) satisfy
ΦM − (1− σ)αoDo ≥ Φm − σαuDu, (29a)
Φm − (1− σ)αuDu ≥ ΦM − σαoDo. (29b)
Note that if a pair of prices (ΦM ,Φm) satisfy (29), they also satisfy constraint
(8) so that the expert reports truthfully if he learns the consumer’s type t
immediately. Let pi(N, TM)− pi(N, Tm) = ∆. Then using (9), we have
ΦM − Φm = ∆+ θαoDo − (1− θ)αuDu. (30)
Constraint (29) is equivalent to
(1− σ − θ)(αoDo + αuDu) ≤ ∆ ≤ (σ − θ)(αoDo + αuDu). (31)
Note that if σ < θ, ∆ < 0 has to hold for (29) to be satisfied, that is, the
expert has to receive more surplus from (N, Tm) than from (N, TM). Propo-
sition 3 below, the proof of which is relegated to the appendix, characterizes
the optimal liability rules that implement the efficient outcome as described
in Lemma 2.
Proposition 3 (i) If σ ≥ θ, the following liability rule results in the efficient
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outcome in equilibrium:
D˜u =
k∗∗ (zo, zu)
(1− θ) (2σ − 1)αu , D˜o =
k∗∗ (zo, zu)
θ (2σ − 1)αo . (32)
(ii) If θ > σ >
θ−
√
θ−θ2
2θ−1
≡ σ˜, the efficient outcome is achieved with liability
rule
D¯o =
k∗∗(zo, zu)
2αo [(1− θ)σ2 − θ(1− σ)2] , D¯u =
k∗∗(zo, zu)
2αu [(1− θ)σ2 − θ(1− σ)2] .
(33)
(iii) If σ ≤ σ ≤ σ˜, the efficient outcome can not be achieved in equilibrium.
Thus, the efficient outcome can be implemented if σ is sufficiently large
(σ > σ˜). Because of constraint (31), the liability rules that implement effi-
ciency differ when σ ≥ θ or σ˜ < σ < θ. But if σ is below the threshold, σ˜,
efficiency cannot be implemented.
Intuitively, when σ ≥ θ > 1/2, ∆ = 0 maximizes k˜(D,Φ) and is also a
feature of the equilibrium price. The analysis is thus similar to that in the
main model where the signal is perfect (σ = 1). As in the main model, the
markups for the two treatments are equal in equilibrium under the efficient
liability rule.
When σ < θ, ∆ < 0 in order for the truthful reporting incentive (31) to
hold. In this case, the equilibrium prices for a given liability rule (Do, Du)
are
Φ¯M = θαoDo, Φ¯m = (1− σ)αuDu + (θ − σ)αoDo. (34)
At the efficient liability rule (D¯o, D¯u), we notice that Φ¯M 6= Φ¯m. Thus,
when the expert’s diagnosis only leads to a noisy signal about the patient’s
problem, the equilibrium markups for the two treatments may not be equal
at the efficient liability rule.
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Finally, when σ ≤ σ˜, σ2(1 − θ) − θ(1 − σ)2 < 0. Given a pair of prices
that satisfy (31) and the upper bound of ∆ in (31), the expert would exert
diagnosis effort only if k is below
k˜(D,Φ) < (σ2(1− θ)− θ(1− σ)2)(αoDo + αuDu) ≤ 0. (35)
Therefore, there is no liability rule that could induce the expert to report
his information truthfully and also to incur any positive diagnosis cost. In
other words, when the signal is not informative enough, even though it is
still welfare-improving to acquire the signal, eliciting truthful reporting of
information from the expert requires unbalanced markups (∆ < 0) for the two
treatments, which in turn squeezes out the expert’s information acquisition
incentive.
5. Conclusion
This paper has studied liability for expert services in a model of adverse
selection and moral hazard. We have shown that a liability rule can be
designed to motivate the expert to choose both the treatment type and the
diagnosis effort efficiently. This efficient liability rule assesses penalty to
the expert contingent on whether his “malpractice” involves overtreatment
or undertreatment and the size of the consumer loss. The penalty may be
punitive, in the sense it exceeds consumer’s loss, and is higher when the
probability of detection for the mistreatment is lower. We also find that
the efficient outcome can be achieved with a well-designed liability rule even
when the expert’s diagnosis effort produces a noisy signal about the nature of
the consumer’s problem, but only when the signal is sufficiently informative.
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A prominent example of credence goods is medical services provided by
physicians. Our results offer insights on the regulation of physicians/hospitals’
incentives through a well-designed liability rule and appropriate payment
schemes. First, our efficient liability rule suggests that there should be a
distinction between overtreatment and undertreatment in the enforcement
of liability rules in credence good markets. Both types of mistreatments
can cause harm to consumers. Although overtreatment has been largely ig-
nored in the credence good literature, it has attracted much attention in
recent years and, as a response, “fraud liability based on overtreatment” has
emerged.13 Our theory suggests that if there is a positive probability that
an overtreatment can be verified, an outcome-contingent liability rule would
improve market efficiency.
Second, policy and regulation should aim to achieve balanced prices—
taking into account the liability cost—for different types of treatments. When
the price margins for different types of treatments differ substantially, experts
are not incentivized to recommend the most appropriate treatment.14 Our
analysis indicates that to combat this problem, in addition to possibly reduc-
ing the difference in price margins for different treatments, a well-designed
liability rule can generate the same expected payoff to the expert—even if
13Overtreatment is claimed to be among the major reasons for the ever-increasing
medicare expenses in the U.S.. The American College of Physicians estimates
that $250 billion is wasted annually on all excessive testing and treatment in
the U.S.. See Press Release, MedSolutions, MedSolutions responds to Choos-
ing Wisely Campaign, Which Highlights Unnecessary Tests and Procedures (Apr.
5, 2012), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/idUS162843+05-Apr-
2012+BW20120405. A prominent case on overtreatment is the investigation undertaken
by DOJ into the medical appropriateness of using implantable cardioverter defibrillators
(ICDs).
14In 2011, John Dempsy Hospital was reported to administer chest “combination scans”
at nearly ten times the national average. A related fact was that hospitals administering
combination scans earn more in reimbursement from the medicare program than those
that administer just one scan to a patient.(Buck, 2015.)
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price margins differ—from different types of treatment. This can then deter
the expert from recommending the wrong type of treatment.15
Third, the efficient liability rule require damage payments that may be
well above the consumer’s verified loss. Unlike other products for which
consumer loss from product malfunction is relatively easy to determine, con-
sumer loss from mistreatment for a credence good such as physician service
has a much lower probability to be detected and verified, possibly requiring
the assistance of other experts. In such situations, a high damage award may
appear excessive ex post for a particular consumer given her verifiable loss,
but is nevertheless needed ex ante to provide the efficient incentive for the
expert.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. Replacing ΦM − Φm in (28) by (30), we have
k˜(D,Φ) = min


− (θσ + (1− θ)(1− σ))∆ + θ(1− θ) (2σ − 1) (αoDo + αuDu) ,
(θ(1− σ) + (1− θ)σ)∆ + θ(1− θ) (2σ − 1) (αoDo + αuDu)


=


− (θσ + (1− θ)(1− σ))∆ + θ(1− θ) (2σ − 1) (αoDo + αuDu) if ∆ > 0
(θ(1− σ) + (1− θ)σ)∆ + θ(1− θ) (2σ − 1) (αoDo + αuDu) if ∆ < 0
.
15China has recently carried out a reform in health care system by increasing physicians’
service/treatment fees while reducing the markups hospitals receive from selling medicines.
This reform, aimed at curbing the overselling of expensive and unnecessary medicines,
may fail to prevent overprovision of high-margin checkups and treatments if there is no
corresponding reform in phyisician/hopital liability.
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Note that k˜(D,Φ) is maximized if ∆ = 0. The consumer surplus from the
three strategies, (N, TM), (N, Tm) and ET are respectively:
S(N, TM) = θ [−zo − ΦM − C + αoDo] + (1− θ) [−ΦM − C] , (36)
S(N, Tm) = −θΦm + (1− θ) [−zu − Φm + αuDu] , (37)
S (ET ) = −θ [σΦm + (1− σ)(ΦM + C − αoDo)]
− (1− θ) [σ (ΦM + C) + (1− σ)(Φm − αuDu)] . (38)
(i) σ ≥ θ. To satisfy (31), ∆ can be either positive or negative.
If ∆ > 0, pi(N, TM) > pi(N, Tm), the expert would choose TM if he is not
initially informed about t and also does not incur k. Note that the consumer
surplus
S (ET )− S(N, TM)
= θ [σ (ΦM − Φm + C − αoDo) + zo] + (1− θ) (1− σ) [(ΦM + C)− (Φm − αuDu)]
= θ [σ (∆ + C − (1− θ) (αuDu + αoDo)) + zo]
+ (1− θ) (1− σ) [∆ + C + θ (αoDo + αuDu)]
= θσ (∆ + C) + (1− θ) (1− σ) (∆ + C) + θzo − θ (1− θ) (2σ − 1) (αoDo + αuDu)
is positive if the liabilities satisfy
αuDu + αoDo (39)
≤ min {[θσ + (1− θ) (1− σ)]C + θzo,− [θ(1− σ) + (1− θ)σ]C + (1− θ) zu}
θ (1− θ) (2σ − 1) .
Thus, the consumer prefers ET to (N, TM). By reducing ΦM (thus reducing
∆), k˜(D,Φ) will rise and the expert incurs the diagnosis cost more often
and the consumer pays a lower price. Thus, if ∆ > 0, it is optimal for the
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consumer to reduce ∆ by reducing ΦM .
Similarly, one can show that if liabilities satisfy (39), ∆ < 0 is not optimal
for the consumer either. As a result, an optimal price must satisfy ∆ = 0.
Further note that a pair of prices such that pi(N, TM) = pi(N, Tm) = 0 satisfy
∆ = 0 and at the same time are the lowest possible prices that guarantee
(10), therefore, the consumer’s optimal price must be
ΦˆM = θαoDo, Φˆm = (1− θ)αuDu. (40)
From (28), using the optimal prices (40), the expert incurs k if and only if
k ≤ k˜
(
D, Φˆ
)
= θ(1 − θ) (2σ − 1) (αuDu + αoDo) . Note that the efficient
outcome is implemented in equilibrium if and only if k˜(D, Φˆ) = k∗∗(zo, zu).
It is straightforward to show that liability rule (32) satisfies (39) and indeed
leads to k˜(D, Φˆ) = k∗∗(zo, zu), thus achieving the efficient outcome.
(ii) θ > σ >
θ−
√
θ−θ2
2θ−1
≡ σ˜. Since σ < θ, satisfying (31) requires ∆ < 0.
From (28), we get
k˜(D,Φ) = (θ(1− σ) + (1− θ)σ)∆ + θ(1− θ) (2σ − 1) (αoDo + αuDu) .
Following the same procedure in part (i), one can show that if the liabilities
satisfy
αoDo + αuDu ≤ (1− θ)zu − (θ(1− σ) + (1− θ)σ)C
σ2(1− θ)− θ(1− σ)2 , (41)
S(ET ) − S(N, Tm) > 0 and the largest ∆ is optimal for the consumer. Ac-
counting for constraint (10), the equilibrium prices must be
Φ¯M = θαoDo, Φ¯m = (1− σ)αuDu + (θ − σ)αoDo.
With the equilibrium prices (Φ¯M , Φ¯m), the expert exerts diagnosis effort if
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and only if k does not exceed k¯
(
D, Φ¯
)
= [(1− θ)σ2 − θ(1− σ)2] (αoDo + αuDu).
As a result, liability rule (33) aligns the expert’s incentive with that of a so-
cial planner and leads to k¯
(
D, Φ¯
)
= k∗∗(zo, zu). Since (D¯o, D¯u) indeed satisfy
(41), the efficient outcome is obtained in equilibrium.
(iii) σ ≤ σ˜. This is equivalent to σ2(1 − θ) − θ(1 − σ)2 ≤ 0. For any
pair of prices that satisfy (31), the expert exerts diagnosis effort if k does not
exceed
k˜(D,Φ) = (θ(1− σ) + (1− θ)σ)∆ + θ(1− θ) (2σ − 1) (αoDo + αuDu)
≤ (σ2(1− θ)− θ(1− σ)2) (αoDo + αuDu) ≤ 0
where the second line obtains by replacing ∆ with its upper bound (σ −
θ)(αoDo + αuDu) in (31). Thus, there does not exist a pair of prices that
ensures both honest reporting by the expert given his private information
and efficient exertion of diagnosis effort.
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